

# The Disparate Correlates of Populist Support in the United States

Political Research Quarterly  
2024, Vol. 0(0) 1–15  
© The Author(s) 2024  
Article reuse guidelines:  
[sagepub.com/journals-permissions](https://sagepub.com/journals-permissions)  
DOI: 10.1177/10659129241289135  
[journals.sagepub.com/home/prq](https://journals.sagepub.com/home/prq)



Miles T. Armaly<sup>1</sup>  and Adam M. Enders<sup>2</sup> 

## Abstract

Recent years have witnessed a global uptick in populist candidates and sentiment. Populist communication and campaign styles are well-studied, but whom in the U.S. mass public is attracted to populist ideas and why is still subject to debate. Using unique survey data, we employ latent profile analysis to estimate constellations of characteristics and orientations that relate to support for populist ideas in the United States. Instead of a single, linear path, there are several routes to populist support composed of many combinations of social, psychological, and political characteristics. Whereas some turn to populism because they feel like victims of the political system, others do so to create exclusive sovereignty for their preferred identity group(s). We also find that populist support is more connected to psychological and political orientations than socioeconomic circumstances or even political predispositions, such as partisanship. While populism, itself, is not anti-democratic, some forms of populist support appear to be exclusionary on the grounds of race, religion, and political identity.

## Keywords

populism, victimhood, white identity, Christian nationalism, conspiracy theory

## Introduction

At its core, populism is defined by the moral and political battle between the masses and elites. Yet, support for populism and populist candidates is more than just an anti-elitist orientation. As [Urbinati \(2019\)](#) notes, theoretically speaking, populism perverts “...the democratic principles of the majority and the people, in a way that is meant to celebrate one subset of the people...populism’s ambition is to construct new forms of popular sovereignty that enhance partial inclusiveness...” (124). We argue that populist attitudes in the United States are a response to this aim, but not universally so for all who support populist sentiments.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, we argue that there is no *single* reason individuals support populism (see [Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert, 2020](#)). This is consistent with the view of populism as a “thin-centered” ideology ([Mudde, 2004](#)), which “enables populism to embrace anti-systemic ideas from different political sides” ([Lüders et al., 2021](#)). In other words, populism can take on many forms and fit many political agendas; our goal is to identify some of those forms, at the individual-level, in the United States.

Even though populist sentiment is often studied cross-nationally (but see [Berman, 2021](#); [Levi, Sendroiu and Hagan, 2020](#); [Mutz, 2018](#)), recent scholarship on the

nature of populist attitudes argues that most relationships with populism “seem non-universal, calling for future research into the contextuality of psychological predispositions for populist...attitudes” ([Hofstetter and Filsinger, 2024](#)). [Hofstetter and Filsinger \(2024\)](#) also argue that, “...the history and ideological nature of populism varies across countries” and “the multidimensionality [of populist attitudes]...is confined to particular country contexts.” In other words, allowing both underlying attitudes *and* context to vary is complicated. Because existing work indicates there are not universal pathways to populism, we argue it is critical to hold context constant. As such, we hold context constant by focusing only on a single country, which allows us to examine whether and how various sets of attitudes relate to populism. In future research, once we know the group

<sup>1</sup>University of Mississippi, University, MS, USA

<sup>2</sup>University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA

## Corresponding Author:

Adam M. Enders, University of Louisville, Ford Hall, Rm 205,  
Louisville, KY 40292, USA.

Email: [amende01@louisville.edu](mailto:amende01@louisville.edu)

of attitudes that matter, we can test them in a more confirmatory, deductive way across contexts (e.g., countries) to determine if some commonalities exist in populist attitudes.

Scholars analyzing the roots of populist support often focus on macro origins, such as social and economic decline (Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth, 2021) or potential job insecurity (Guiso et al., 2017). We, like many others, focus more narrowly on individual-level factors, often subjective and perceptual in nature, that promote populist support (e.g., Cena, Roccato and Russo, 2023; Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert, 2020; Lüders et al., 2021; Marchlewska et al., 2018; Pettigrew, 2017). Thus, we join scholarship examining attitudes such as trust in elites (Rooduijn, 2018), trust in institutions (Fieschi and Heywood, 2004), relative deprivation (Smith et al., 2012), external political efficacy (Rooduijn, Van Der Brug, and De Lange, 2016), and economic grievances (Eichengreen, 2018). Some, like Geurkink et al. (2020), tend to take a more holistic approach and consider a number of attitudes in tandem.

Our goal in this paper is to highlight that there are several “constellations” of characteristics that relate to populism—some fueled by reactions to government and elites, some rooted in identity-based grievances, and others still a combination—rather than a single, linear path (see Hartevelde et al., 2022). To do so, we curate a list of potential correlates—some previously identified by others, but many of which are unique to this investigation and to the U.S. context—that allow us to more comprehensively decipher classes of populism. Generally speaking, we argue that no one attitude, or even set of attitudes, can adequately explain who supports these types of populist ideas. This concept is not without precedent (Hofstetter and Filsinger, 2024).

We argue that those who exhibit the strongest populist views see themselves as the victims of politics and feel that their salient in-groups—for instance, religious and racial—have experienced (relative) losses of power or have never been afforded the opportunity to wield power (see Cena, Roccato, and Russo, 2023; Lüders et al., 2021). We believe this is the case even in the absence of “genuine” losses of power (see Pettigrew, 2017). Support for populism, then, can be considered instrumental in achieving political supremacy for one’s preferred group. While extant studies have examined the role of, for instance, religious and racial identity in relation to populist support (Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy, 2016), we consider a slew of factors that we argue underscore populism: Among others, perceived victimhood, income and access to health insurance, general feelings of powerlessness, white identity, and even Christian nationalism.<sup>2</sup>

Though we suspect many orientations should relate to populist attitudes, the exact constellation of attitudes is likely messy and heterogeneous. For some individuals, socioeconomic deprivation may not promote populist ideas, but cultural orientations regarding white status threat or a perceived marginalization of Christianity do. For others, the process could be the exact opposite. Or, one’s populism may entail some other combination of individual-level circumstances and orientations. In this way, a determination of who supports populist ideas and why is more like a maze than a labyrinth. Though similar, a labyrinth is unicursal (meaning it has only one path to the center) and a maze is multicursal (meaning there are multiple paths). As the existing literature on populism indicates, a maze is the more apt metaphor: There is a shared, equifinal end (i.e., populism), but the paths they take can be distinct. Critically, we do *not* suggest that these pathways to populist support are necessarily causal; indeed, our analysis cannot ascribe causality. Rather, we seek to shed light on the complicated and heterogeneous psychological entanglements with populist attitudes.

In light of the several routes by which one may support populist ideas, we forgo standard regression-based approaches to determining the correlates of populism. Using a unique, national survey of 1003 U.S. adults, we conduct a latent profile analysis (LPA)—an empirically grounded, person-centered methodology that is new to the field of populism, which is specifically suited to identify mutually exclusive profiles of individuals sharing similar patterns of response across multiple potential covariates of populist sentiment. By subjecting the various individual-level attitudes, orientations, and characteristics that may be indicative of support for populism to an LPA, we are able to decipher categories of individuals who possess a constellation of the aforementioned orientations (e.g., white identity and powerlessness). This analysis uncovers 10 categories of individuals across 19 distinct individual-level factors, with a handful of classes being high in populism and a handful being low. The four categories that exhibit the highest level of support for populist sentiments contain individuals with different profiles of attitudes, identities, and worldviews:

1. The first contains individuals who exhibit a relatively high degree of religiosity, but only middling levels of Christian nationalism, conspiracism, perceived victimhood, and authoritarianism. These individuals are also more likely to be liberal and identify with the Democratic Party.
2. The second involves individuals who are not particularly religious, but who identify as conservative and Republican, and who exhibit relatively high levels of racial resentment and conspiracism.

3. The third contains individuals who are not religious, who are heterogeneous in their partisan and ideological orientations, and who exhibit relatively high levels of conspiracism and egocentric victimhood.
4. The fourth involves individuals who exhibit high levels of religiosity, including Christian nationalism, conspiracism, perceived victimhood, and authoritarianism. While exhibiting a high level of white identity (and in-group racial orientation), racial resentment (an out-group orientation) is low.

Altogether, these patterns suggest that populism is linked to support for regimes that govern for the few at the expense of the many, though the “many” is not uniform.

### *Government Orientations, Identity, and Populism*

We begin by stating what we mean by “populism” in this paper. There are many different flavors of populism, and definitions, origins, and consequences tend to be conditioned by political culture (see [Mansbridge and Macedo, 2019](#)). Critically, and despite contemporary rhetoric, the American flavor of populism is not inherently connected to any particular political party or ideology; there are both right-leaning (e.g., Donald Trump) and left-leaning (e.g., Bernie Sanders) populist leaders (see [Oliver and Rahn, 2016](#)). And while different political groups define “...the principal foe of the people” ([Lowndes, 2017](#), 233) in different ways, common threads weave together populist sentiment across partisan and ideological lines. By and large, American populism is anti-intellectual and anti-elite, emphasizes systemic inequities, highlights political inefficacy, and promotes the political power of the people ([Oliver and Rahn, 2016](#)). We believe a slew of psychological predispositions and political attitudes will relate to this flavor of populism (see [Marchlewska et al., 2018](#); [Pettigrew, 2017](#)).

The origins of populism—whether it is brought about by reactions to higher-order systems, or grievances toward out-groups—are far from agreed upon. The former explanation suggests that populism rises out of the inattention of elites to the problems of the masses and reactions to that inattention (e.g., [Evans et al., 1985](#)). The latter explanation argues that the cause of populism is the grievances—primarily economic and cultural—of citizens and the resulting demands on elected leaders (e.g., [Piketty, 2017](#)). These grievances tend to place disproportionate blame on “others,” which often refers to racial and religious minority groups.

Regardless of political culture or origins, some common themes emerge in populism scholarship (see [Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018](#)). [Berman \(2021\)](#) describes populism as “a political movement emphasizing a

Manichean, us-versus-them worldview in which the ‘us’ refers to the ‘people’” and “them” is defined as “elites, the establishment, and minorities and/or immigrants.” Similarly, [Mansbridge and Macedo \(2019\)](#) identify an “exclusive people” and “nationalism” as two of the core elements of populism. Our goal in this paper is not to distinguish between the various accounts of populist support, nor is it to determine precisely which macro-political circumstances promote populist sentiment to the greatest degree. Rather, our goal is to highlight that support for populism has many distinct constellations, where different individual-level factors may underlie the endorsement of populist ideas for some, but not for others. Our central argument is that different people can possess populist ideas for entirely different reasons; for some it may be discontentment with the government (e.g., [Fieschi and Heywood, 2004](#)), for others it is social marginalization (e.g., [Gidron and Hall, 2020](#)), and for others still it may be both. We turn our attention to curating a list of potential correlates that measure the individual-level reactions to systemic forces and to political “others” that may prove useful in explaining support for populist ideas.

### *System-Based Grievances*

Scholarship on populist attitudes has highlighted a number of elite- and government-driven sources. These accounts focus on “the growing inability or unwillingness of elites and institutions to supply responses to citizens’ demands” ([Berman, 2021](#)). In keeping with existing scholarship (e.g., [Hofstetter and Filsinger, 2024](#); [Pettigrew, 2017](#)), we focus principally on subjective perceptions of and feelings about the state of affairs (rather than the objective truth of the matter). We operationalize reactions to systemic forces as perceived victimhood, and theorize it will relate to populist sentiment. [Armaly and Enders \(2022\)](#) identify two forms of perceived victimhood, egocentric and systemic. Egocentric victimhood relates to the belief that one gets less than is deserved, while systemic relates to the view that “the system” is rigged, both of which may relate to support for populism. Generally speaking, these (related, but distinct) constructs measure the level to which one feels they do not get a fair shake in the world, that there are systemic oppressors. Inasmuch as these are precisely the feelings described in some accounts of populist sentiment, we have reason to believe that those who feel that they are victims—perhaps of elites—are more likely to support populism. For instance, individuals who agree with statements like “the system works against people like me” (i.e., those high in systemic victimhood) or “I rarely get what I deserve in life” (i.e., high in egocentric) would also tend to agree that politicians and other elites are working more for themselves and the establishment than “the people.”

While neither egocentric nor systemic victimhood measure system-level causes of populism, specifically, they serve as summary measures of subjective discontentment with the existing power system and one's place therein. As such, each should positively relate to populist sentiment. Importantly, victimhood does not neatly align with the left-right political spectrum; there are both Democratic/liberal and Republican/conservative victims. Thus, there is little concern about self-identified victims supporting populism to wrestle political control back from the party currently in power. Finally, victimhood, on its own, may be an incomplete picture. It may be negative *political* reactions, specifically, that relate to populism. As [Armaly and Enders \(2022\)](#) note, both egocentric and systemic victimhood are fairly general; they are not indicative of "political victimhood," per se. Thus, we also consider more specific political reactions, such as (dis)trust in and perceived corruption of government, which should also be positively related to populism, as others have found (see [Geurkink et al., 2020](#)).

Finally, we expect that predispositions toward authoritarianism and conspiracism may also be indicative of the factors associated with populism, as recent work suggests ([Feldman, 2021](#); [Stecula and Pickup, 2021](#); [Uscinski et al., 2021](#)). First, authoritarian politicians tend to employ both populist ([Norris and Inglehart, 2019](#)) and conspiratorial rhetoric ([Oliver and Rahn, 2016](#)); popular examples include Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Donald Trump in the United States. Regardless of political conditions or elite behavior, both authoritarianism and conspiratorial thinking usually entail a critique of the established power structure: Either it is too weak and insufficiently protective of particular norms, cultural practices, or groups, or it is, itself, part of a shadowy conspiracy to subvert those norms, cultural practices, and the will of "the people." Individuals of both types are likely to be less satisfied with the government and political outcomes and more likely to support populist ideas, either because they critique those in power, champion the masses, or both.

### Group-Based Grievances

Inasmuch as some accounts of populism are reactions to abstract, system-level forces, other accounts focus on more specific, narrow grievances. These accounts of attitudinal populism tend to focus on perceived threats from minority racial and religious groups (e.g., [Bonikowski, 2017](#); [Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy, 2016](#); [Rydgren, 2005](#)), more general feelings of social marginalization ([Cena, Roccato, and Russo, 2023](#); [Gidron and Hall, 2020](#)), and even status threat ([Mutz, 2018](#)). Thus, we also theorize that factors highlighting reactions to groups, psychological characteristics, and one's orientation to the

social and political world will play a crucial role in populism.

Recall that in the us-versus-them element of populism, "them" refers to "elites, the establishment, and minorities and/or immigrants" ([Berman, 2021](#)). As reactions to elites and the establishment are accounted for in measures of victimhood and trust in government, it is important to consider reactions to groups that one may perceive as the cause of their political woes. That is, we argue that attitudes regarding a relevant out-group contribute to support for populism. Specifically, we consider three of the major identities that motivate political attitudes and behaviors: Racial, religious, and political (i.e., partisan and ideological).

We consider the strength of attachment to identity, as this often matters more than the identity itself (e.g., [Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe, 2015](#); [Jardina, 2019](#)). For racial identity, we utilize a measure of white identity (see [Jardina 2019](#)). White identity describes pride in one's whiteness and the belief that the political fortunes of white Americans are linked. As [Jardina \(2019\)](#) shows, white identity is related to a host of attitudes that are clearly linked to the social, racial, and economic grievances highlighted in explanations of populism. Whites appear to view jobs, culture, and economic success as zero-sum, where "more" for non-whites means "less" for whites ([Jardina 2019](#)). These are precisely the types of grievances said to breed populism. While our measure of populist support does not capture the desire to create a white ethnostate, specifically, we suspect that racial (dis)attachments partially overlap with inclusiveness aim of populism. If one thinks policies that promote non-whites will harm whites and white culture, they will surely support points of view and leaders that promise to reverse those policies.<sup>3</sup>

As white identity only indirectly captures attitudes toward minorities and immigrants, we also theorize that symbolic (rather than overt) racism will relate to populism. Racial resentment is a moral critique of Blacks who are perceived as violating the American ideals of hard work and individualism. Racial resentment also taps racial prejudice (e.g., [Kam and Burge, 2018](#)). Each element of racial resentment is useful for our purposes. Violations of the "secularized version of the Protestant ethic" ([Kinder and Sanders, 1996](#), 293) are precisely the types of grievances that should lead to populist support. So, too, are those born from racial animus. Those high in racial resentment would agree that Blacks get more than they deserve and that they should try to get ahead without any special favors. They would likely agree with statements about people benefitting from unfair advantage, indicating populist sentiment.

Next, for religious identity, we consider Christian nationalism ([Whitehead, Perry, and Baker, 2018](#)), which



is a “pervasive set of beliefs and ideals that merge American and Christian group memberships” (165). The link between religion and populist sentiment is far from novel. For instance, [Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy \(2016\)](#) refer to populists as “hijacking” religion. Thus, given the existing evidence on the religious roots of populism, it is important to account for it in our examination of who is a populist in the United States. However, despite this connection, some evidence suggests that the link between religiosity and voting for populists is weak ([Arzheimer and Carter, 2009](#)), and that more religious individuals are more tolerant of foreigners ([Daenekindt, de Koster, and van der Waal, 2017](#)), which is inconsistent with many of the group-based grievances described above. Thus, it is imperative to move beyond denominational considerations. Inasmuch as we expect that elements of one’s identity will relate to support for a popular sovereignty that aids one’s group at the expense of other groups, Christian nationalism should explicitly capture this sentiment. Thus, we theorize that Christian nationalism will positively relate to support for populism.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, we theorize that some political identities may encourage populist support. As populism relates to the “us-versus-them” view of politics, partisan and ideological groups represent major identities that underscore these divisions ([Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012](#); [Mason, 2015](#)). What is more, a multitude of identities are increasingly aligning to shape political behavior ([Mason and Wronski, 2018](#)), indicating that there are fewer cross-cutting cleavages across identity. That is, when one wishes that government worked for her and her group, the group in question may be an amalgam of racial, religious, and political identities (among others). We are fairly agnostic as to whether Republicans/conservatives or Democrats/liberals should, theoretically, exhibit higher levels of populist sentiment (despite the success of Trumpian populism; see [Oliver and Rahn, 2016](#)). Though there are established connections between populism and right wing government, populism in the United States (and worldwide) is not exclusively right wing. Indeed, progressive political leaders like Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez employ populist rhetoric.

## Data and Measurement

To investigate the individual-level factors that might make one attracted to populist ideas, we fielded a survey that included 19 of such factors, in addition to the questions necessary to measure populism. The survey was fielded on 1100 U.S. adults by Lucid in February 2021. U.S. adults were quota sampled to be representative of the U.S. population based on age, race, sex, and education; see the [Supplemental Appendix](#) for a comparison of the


sociodemographic characteristics of the sample with U.S. Census data.<sup>5</sup>

Populism is measured via an additive index of responses, on five-point scales ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5), to the following 8 items developed by [Oliver and Rahn \(2016\)](#):

1. People like me don’t have much say in what government does.
2. Politics usually boils down to a struggle between the people and the powerful.
3. The system is stacked against people like me.
4. It doesn’t really matter who you vote for because the rich control both political parties.
5. People at the top usually get there from some unfair advantage.
6. I’d rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts and intellectuals.
7. When it comes to really important questions, scientific facts don’t help very much.
8. Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.

There are many survey items commonly used to tap populism (see [Castanho Silva et al., 2020](#)). We opt for the [Oliver and Rahn \(2016\)](#) scale largely because it was developed and validated in the context of the United States (see Oliver and Rahn for analyses demonstrating criterion validity with respect to various individual-level political, religious, and psychological factors, as well as support for various political candidates). Importantly, the resultant scale (Range = 1–5,  $M = 3.33$ ,  $SD = 0.80$ ) is both unidimensional<sup>6</sup> and statistically reliable ( $\alpha = 0.83$ ). Thus, we feel comfortable proceeding with this scale (though acknowledge that others may very well serve our purposes equally as well, and encourage replication of our results with different operationalizations of populism).<sup>7</sup> The distribution of the scale appears in [Figure 1](#). There is a slight negative skew to the distribution, signaling that populist sentiments are more common than not in the United States.

We list each of the 19 potential characteristics of individuals who may exhibit support for populist ideas in [Table 1](#), along with details about the range, distribution, and reliability (where applicable) of each variable; precise question wording appears in the [Supplemental Appendix](#).<sup>8</sup> These variables span the political, psychological, and social domains. We have described most of these above in the context of the system-based and group-based grievance framework of populist support; others are familiar to the populism literature. For example, we include political predispositions, particularly because some work finds that populism is more attractive to those on the



**Figure 1.** Distribution of populism. Dashed vertical line represents the mean.

political right than the left (e.g., [Mudde, 2007](#), though such findings are far from axiomatic, and do not describe our sample). We include many sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., income, education, and health insurance) in order to operationalize socioeconomic grievance and deprivation. Finally, we include measures of generalized anxiety and powerlessness, which may capture either political, economic, or social frustration in a different way, as argued in previous work (e.g., [Kinnvall and Svensson, 2022](#)). Correlations between each (potential) covariate and populism appear in [Figure 2](#); only one covariate (health insurance) is not correlated with populism at the  $p < 0.05$  level.

## Methodology

Recall that we can consider our effort to determine who is a populist akin to either a maze or a labyrinth. Where a labyrinth has a single path, a maze has several. The extant literature on populism, which disagrees on the precise etiology of populist sentiment, indicates the multiple-paths approach is warranted—the shared end of support

for populist ideas is reached via multiple routes (though, again, note that we do not intend to determine what *causes* populism). In other words, we argue that some may find populist sentiments attractive because of identity-based grievances, while others who are low in such grievances but high in victimhood may also be populists. Others still may support populism for another set of reasons. Populism can appeal to different people, or groups of people, for different reasons. One of our main goals is to identify these different reasons that would be missed in a typical analytical framework (e.g., linear regression). Thus, to appropriately test our theory, our empirical design must allow for this multiple-paths approach. Latent profile analysis (LPA) does just that.

LPA is a type of mixture model that hypothesizes that a latent (i.e., unobserved) variable divides a given sample into certain classes or groups. Class membership can be determined using observed items. LPA is often used to estimate the number of classes for some outcome of interest, as well as to determine what covariates relate to classification into a given class. As an example, [Alvarez, Levin, and Núñez \(2017\)](#) determine there are 4 classes of

**Table 1.** Descriptive Statistics for all Potential Correlates of Populism.

Variable (Range)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Alpha
Perceived systemic victimhood (1–5)	2.65	1.04	0.83
Perceived egocentric victimhood (1–5)	2.70	1.08	0.89
Generalized anxiety (1–4)	1.84	0.83	0.94
Powerlessness (1–5)	2.30	0.80	0.78
Authoritarianism (1–5)	2.91	0.90	0.65
Conspiratorial thinking (1–5)	3.45	0.94	0.84
White identity (1–5)	3.28	0.95	0.81
Racial resentment (1–5)	2.94	1.05	0.79
Christian nationalism (1–5)	3.04	1.04	0.85
Perceived corruption (1–5)	3.16	0.98	—
Trust in government (1–5)	2.47	0.99	—
Ideology (conservative) (1–7)	4.10	1.85	—
Partisanship (Republican) (1–7)	3.65	2.27	—
Religiosity (1–5)	2.50	1.57	—
Military service (0, 1)	0.15	0.35	—
Income (1–5)	3.35	1.24	—
Health insurance (0, 1)	0.88	0.32	—
Education (1–5)	3.30	1.06	—
Female (0, 1)	0.53	0.50	—


political participation in Argentina, and that being the victim of crime, for instance, is associated with a higher probability of being classified in one participatory class rather than another. The same technique can be utilized to identify the groups of characteristics that relates to each class, as well as incorporate continuous predictors. For instance, [van der Meer, Hameleers, and Kroon \(2020\)](#) utilize this approach to determine which attitudes and preferences are antecedents of biased news selection.

Our aim is to generate (potential) profiles of populism and investigate the levels of each variable therein. Rather than examine, for instance, the marginal probability of females being in one profile versus another, we are interested in the composition of each class itself. For example, what is the level of perceived victimhood in a class high in populism, relative to one low in populism? Moreover, what are the average levels of white identity in high populism classes? In other words, our focus is on the intersection of all of the variables within each class, rather than any given variable's controlled influence. This approach is useful for several reasons. First, many of the potential correlates likely overlap, which can make inference from standard regression-based analyses difficult. Second, we are interested in which groupings of correlates seem to go together, which we can then relate to populist sentiment. This will tell us the constellation of characteristics that those who support populist ideas evince, offering a fuller grasp of who is a populist and why. This and other analyses are executed using Stata version 15.

## Empirical Results

The fit of models with 1 up through 12 latent classes were compared in order to select the “best” number of classes.<sup>9</sup> See [Supplemental Appendix](#) for Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC, respectively). The 10-class model is preferred, based largely on the BIC. [Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthén \(2007\)](#) note that the AIC “has been shown to overestimate the correct number of components” (537) and that the BIC is preferred when deciding on the number of classes. Finally, information in the [Supplemental Appendix](#) reveals that selecting a different number of latent classes provides similar “separation” to the 10-class model (see [Masyn, 2013](#)). Thus, with no evidence that we should deviate from the fit statistics, we select the 10-class model. Regardless, the “correct” number of classes is of less importance to us than the relationships between the various classes and populism, as well as the constellation of characteristics that compose each class.

We begin our substantive analysis by considering the average level of populism by each class, which is displayed in [Figure 3](#). Note that we reordered classes such that the class lowest in populism is Class 1 and the class highest in populism is Class 10. The dashed vertical line is the sample mean for populism (3.33). Four classes (7, 8, 9, and 10) are above average in populism, and four are below average (1–4), with classes 5 and 6 being statistically indistinguishable from the average. This rank order—that is, an ordinal variable noting presence in a class from Class 1 to Class 10 along the vertical axis—nicely



**Figure 2.** Pearson correlations between populism and each potential covariate, with 95% confidence bands.


captures populism overall; the rank order is correlated with our populism variable at 0.58. Thus, at the individual-level, there is a high correspondence between one's class and their expressed level of support for populism.

Many uses of latent profile analysis determine the degree to which a single variable predicts placement in a given class. Does a particular medical intervention predict placement in the "healed" class? Do victims of crime have a higher or lower probability of being classified into the "participates in politics" class (Alvarez, Levin, and Núñez, 2017)? In our case, we are primarily interested in the composition of each class, rather than a focus on any given variable. That is, we wish to know what the profile of an individual high in populism looks like, and whether that differs from the profile of one low in populism. Yet, because we have utilized a broad collection of potential correlates, we are somewhat constrained in our ability to present the composition of each class in an accessible

manner. Thus, we cull our list of variables to a more easily presentable number, though we do not do so arbitrarily. In short, the variables that offer little discrimination between classes are omitted from Figure 4, where we display the composition of each class. Consider the health insurance variable; the vast majority of our respondents have health insurance, so we learn very little about populism profiles from examining this variable. Additionally, we display attitudinal characteristics rather than demographic ones; an LPA conducted with only attitudinal characteristics produces substantively identical results to those displayed here. See the Supplemental Appendix for more information on how we selected the variables shown here, as well as a figure that displays the full suite of correlates.

We wish to stress, once again, that we cannot make statements about causality with this analytical approach. Below, we display the combination of values of our covariates (i.e., classes) that have a high mean in populism. But, this is not to say that these variables *cause*





**Figure 3.** Average populism score by class. Dashed vertical line is the total sample average. Number in parenthetical is percentage of sample classified into class. Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals.


individual-level populism; populism may cause, for example, greater conspiratorial thinking or higher levels of anxiety. We cannot say which with the data we possess, but we can link various attitudes and identities with varying levels of populist attitudes such that we can learn about which collection of covariates relates to populism. We return to such questions in the discussion section.

Figure 4 is a radar plot, which is a useful tool for comparing various characteristics (here, variables) on two or more groups (here, classes). We only display the four classes greater in populism than the sample mean, though a radar plot with all 10 classes appears in the [Supplemental Appendix](#). Each radius (or “spoke” on the “wheel”) represents a single variable.<sup>10</sup> The zero point for each variable is at the centroid, or the center of the wheel. Moving away from the centroid toward the circumference, or outside perimeter, along a radius indicates that the mean value of the relevant variable is approaching the maximum (here, a value of 1, as all variables are rescaled 0–1). By way of example, consider the sector (i.e., the triangular shaped wedge) attendance in Class 7; because it is the furthest from the centroid, we can state the variable with the highest average level in Class 7 is attending religious services. Panels are arranged from

Class 7 to Class 10 in correspondence with the average level of populist support.

Because results of LPA inherently come in the form of multivariate distributions that can be difficult to digest, we also present results in an alternative, tabular format. [Table 2](#) displays the difference between the mean of each variable within a given class and the overall sample mean of that variable. For example, among individuals in class 10, the mean value of egocentric victimhood is 0.43 greater than the total sample mean of egocentric victimhood, suggesting that this variable is important in distinguishing this class from the total sample and other classes.

We argue that focusing on particular variables, rather than *groups* of variables, is not a fruitful approach. Consider again Class 7, the least populist class (of the four displayed here). The highest average of any variable in the class is religious attendance, a mean of 0.78 (or, a difference between the class mean and the sample mean of 0.40, as shown in [Table 2](#)). But, consider Class 8. Here, religious attendance is quite low—a mean of 0.14 (or, a difference between the class mean and the sample mean of  $-0.26$ , as shown in [Table 2](#)). It is clear that we cannot state that high levels of religious attendance are



**Figure 4.** Radar plot of variable means within class for classes high in populism. A larger sector (i.e., further from the center along a given radius) indicates a greater mean. All variables rescaled 0–1.

necessarily associated with populism, as the churchgoers in Class 7 and the non-churchgoers in Class 8 are fairly similar in their levels of populism. This example highlights why we are not interested in comparisons of individual variables *across* classes, but rather the levels of the variables *within* a class. While we place particular emphasis on classes 7–10, or the classes significantly greater in populism support than the sample average, the converse of these relationships is true (i.e., it is the relative lack of *several* factors that relates to low populist support).

Individuals in Class 7 appear to be frequent churchgoers and tend to see themselves as victims. But, those in

Class 7 are not particularly attached to their whiteness nor do they express racial animus. We see a similar profile for those in Class 9, though religious attendance is much lower for this class and victimhood is somewhat elevated. In addition, Class 9 is also heterogeneous in terms of partisan and ideological identities. By contrast, consider Class 8. These individuals are not self-described victims or frequent churchgoers, but they seem to be attached to their racial in-group and decry the racial out-group; in addition, this class is disproportionately Republican and conservative. Thus, this group's attraction to populism seems bottom-up, or more grievance- than system-based. They focus more on group grievances than the belief that

**Table 2.** Difference From Mean for Each Correlate, by Class. Positive Values Indicate Mean for Class is Higher Than Sample Mean; Negative Values Indicate Mean for Class is Lower Than Sample Mean. All Variables Rescaled 0–1.

	Class 7	Class 8	Class 9	Class 10
Populism	0.28	0.46	0.50	0.96
Ideology (conservative)	−0.12	0.23	0.01	−0.25
Partisanship (Rep.)	−0.17	0.33	0.02	−0.30
Authoritarianism	0.10	−0.01	0.02	0.41
Conspiracy thinking	0.05	0.17	0.12	0.23
Egocentric victimhood	0.17	0.10	0.32	0.43
Systemic victimhood	0.19	0.09	0.26	0.43
White identity	−0.07	0.13	−0.06	0.30
Religious attendance	0.40	−0.26	−0.29	0.52
Christian nationalism	−0.02	0.12	0.00	0.21
Racial resentment	−0.09	0.25	0.04	−0.02

elites are non-responsive to their demands (though they also seem to view the world conspiratorially). Finally, Class 10 may be deemed the group- and system-based grievance populists, those who believe they are victims of shadowy politics, wish for a “strongman” leader to address these issues, and are attached to their whiteness and America’s Christian tradition.<sup>11</sup>

In all, we find support for the notion that there are multiple constellations of variables that relate to populism (or not). In some instances, constellations that look somewhat similar are related to populism in different ways; some strongly attached to party, ideology, and racial identity are not populist (see Class 3 in [Supplemental Appendix](#)), but those similarly situated *who are also conspiratorial* (Class 8) may be more attracted to populist ideas. So, it is not that, say, system-based grievances always beget populism, nor do group-based ones. Nor is it that, say, racial resentment always yields populism; some classes high in populism (e.g., Class 8) are racially resentful on average, but others (e.g., Class 10) are not. The same is true of several other orientations and attachments.

Finally, we note that we compare the maze and labyrinth in the [Supplemental Appendix](#) by examining the results of an OLS regression of populist attitudes on all of the potential predictors explored above. We believe [Figure 4](#) and [Table 2](#) demonstrate that the LPA approach is warranted, as several of our covariates are clearly non-linearly related to the classes of populism. In short, 6 of the 19 variables we explore are statistically significant, including some that appear in high populism classes. But, 13 variables are not, even though we know they relate to populist attitudes (per the analysis above). This showcases the methodological and substantive value of our strategy.

## Conclusion

In 2014, the European Parliament experienced a “populist earthquake” ([McDonnell and Werner, 2020](#)). Yet, no one form of populism was identical to another. In Germany, The Left Party argued that the capitalist system is the root of German problems. In France, the French Front National focused on immigration as the major cause of French suffering. A few years later, in the United States, Donald Trump and the Republican Party argued that entrenched elites were hurting normal Americans, as were immigrants. Italy, India, the United Kingdom, and Brazil are a few more notable examples of countries who have experienced a rise in populist leaders and sentiment since the turn of the century. In 2018, twenty executives around the world were considered populist, a five-fold increase from 1990 ([Kyle and Gultchin, 2018](#)).

One conclusion may be that, because populism is bred in each country’s unique sociopolitical environment, “populism” is merely a single term that refers to many distinct concepts. Some focus on elite, government, and system-based causes, others on group-based causes. While this may be a useful way to differentiate populist *leaders*, it says little of the orientations that make populism attractive to people at the individual-level. Our goal in this paper was to determine who supports populist ideas and why in the United States. We find that, just as is the case when it comes to support for populist elites, individuals support the broader idea of populism for a host of reasons. Some feel like victims of the political system, engage in conspiratorial thinking about nefarious elites, and are likely to support authoritarian leaders that can provide relief from the existing, punishing status quo. Others do not feel like victims of the system, but of people who are not like them in identity terms; they are high in white identity, Christian nationalism, and racial resentment. Others who support populism reject both the status quo *and* lay blame on counter-identity forces. Thus, while questions about populism have centered on blame attribution (i.e., on orientations toward elites perceived as non-responsive, or toward out-groups perceived to get more than they deserve), we find that these are not mutually exclusive, even at the level of the individual.

In addition to contributing to the understanding of who supports populist ideas and why, we also believe our results provide avenues for future research on both the formation and effect of populist attitudes, particularly those that are driven by social identity. Future studies might apply our constellations to additional substantive questions. For example, are some classes of populism more prone to top-down mobilization, do political elites capitalize on existing classes of populism in a bottom-up manner, or is there some synergistic, cyclic effect where elite and mass populism rise in tandem for some classes

but not others? Further, while we are careful to distinguish between normatively “good” and “bad” variants of populism, scholars and societal leaders might focus on how to counter the non-democratic variants of populism, perhaps by employing or avoiding appeals to the various social identities that we find predict populism.

On its face, populism is not anti-democratic or inherently dangerous. And, despite the rancor that populist leaders may generate, McDonnell and Werner (2020) indicate that many populist movements end more with a whimper than a bang. For some parties, populist rhetoric is a useful electoral strategy that is later tampered or abandoned once in power; some are coopted by other, more moderate groups (McDonnell and Werner, 2020). Yet, at the same time, the grievance-based, cultural forms of populism seem to be on the rise globally (Kyle and Gultchin, 2018). If our analysis revealed that individual-level populist sentiment is more socioeconomic than cultural, and that there is an incongruence between elite forms and mass forms of populism, we would possess little evidence that populism poses a threat in the United States. However, we find that all manner of grievances—primarily racial and religious—help us determine who is a populist. Inasmuch as some forms of populism pose greater threats to democratic norms and popular sovereignty than others, we believe our results aid in differentiating the types of sentiments among the masses on which we should keep a close eye. Indeed, Piazza (Forthcoming) recently found that populism is connected with support for political violence in the United States.

Our study is not without limitations. While we have, to our knowledge, examined the most comprehensive set of individual-level factors that may promote an attraction to populist sentiments in the United States, there are surely other factors that we have missed. Reasonable candidates might include more explicit operationalizations of status threat, sexism, and finer grained measures of socioeconomic deprivation, as well as purely psychological factors that oftentimes relate to ideology, such as system justification, need for cognitive closure, and narcissism. Populism may be more rooted in innate psychological orientations than previous work, including our own, assumes (though see Bakker, Rooduijn, and Schumacher, 2016). We also encourage future work to examine and expand our correlates in other sociopolitical contexts. Even though populism may manifest in very different ways across cultures from elites and systems, the individual-level ingredients may be quite similar across particular contexts (see Mudde and Rovire Kaltwasser, 2018). Indeed, while we argue that the multiple-paths perspective is generalizable to other contexts (see Hartevelde et al., 2022), as are some of the more abstract categories of paths (e.g., economic grievances and identity

characteristics), the specific paths are likely to differ across contexts. Additional comparative work in this vein could achieve the important task of deciphering what unites populist attitudes across the world, just as existing work has highlighted a number of dispositions that are structurally similar but have different precise meanings globally (e.g., ideology).

Moreover, we are unable to say that any one attitude/identity or collection of attitudes/identities *causes* populism. Our data are observational, and it is possible that populist attitudes lead to, say, lower trust in government or higher racial resentment. Perhaps there is reciprocal causality, whereby populism and other attitudes mutually reinforce one another? We believe future scholarship might focus on identifying the causal ordering of populist attitudes. Finally, we reiterate an earlier discussion about our inability to decipher the potential pathways to populism among minority groups (e.g., racial, religious, and sexual orientation) due to insufficient sample sizes. Even though we suspect many of the pathways we have identified traverse race and other group identities, it also stands to reason that minority status itself produces a unique set of motivations for populist attitudes—future work should take this possibility seriously and take the steps necessary to conduct subgroup analyses (e.g., oversampling).

### Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

### Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

### ORCID iDs

Miles T. Armaly  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8945-5797>

Adam M. Enders  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9315-8178>

### Data Availability Statement

Materials necessary for replicating the results presented in the main text and supplementary material is available on the Open Science Framework: <https://osf.io/6qp9v/>.

### Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

### Notes

1. We use a number of terms interchangeably, such as “populist sentiment” and “populist ideas.” While the term “populist” may refer to elites who engage in populist rhetoric, we use it

here to refer to an individual who supports populist ideas or leaders.

2. Inasmuch as our investigation centers on the United States, the predominant point of view is white and Christian. However, we do not merely seek to connect perceived losses in power for this dominant group to populism. Our approach—which includes subjective perceptions of the political world, as well as (the lack of) attachment to certain in-groups—allows us to determine if members of the dominant in-group who do not identify that way (e.g., whites not attached to their whiteness) also support populism. In addition, marginalized groups may also be attracted to populism, though we admit our ability to uncover such support is limited (as is the case with any survey data that does not oversample marginalized groups). Given the goals of populism—to increase the political power of groups perceived to be underserved—support for populism among the marginalized is sensible. The puzzle in which we are interested is why people who have no obvious reason to be populist are populist.
  3. There is some possibility that members of the mass public are attracted to populist leaders or parties because they support a specific policy. Consider an individual strongly in favor of efforts to mitigate climate change supporting a populist candidate for this policy position alone. However, evidence suggests most individuals support policies that their preferred leaders support (e.g., [Lenz, 2012](#)). Further, if an individual comes to support additional populist propositions after supporting a candidate due to a specific policy, we would still consider them populist for our purposes. Indeed, we are less concerned with the exact etiology of support for populism and more concerned with the correlates associated with high levels of populism.
  4. Even though we argue that including attachment to various forms of identity, rather than indicators for the identity itself, is a strength of our manuscript, it also limits the scope of our findings in one important way. White and Christian identity are the dominant identities in the United States; some may argue we are only able to identify correlates of support for populism for this majoritarian group. While we disagree with this claim—the lack of such identities is also critically important in identifying populist support—we recognize that we cannot uncover the attraction to populism for, say, those attached to their Blackness, Muslim nationalists, members of the LGBTQ+ community, or any other member of minority-identity groups. Ultimately, we believe this is not an issue of including the appropriate items on surveys, but of sampling. Even with nationally representative probability samples, racial, religious, and sexual-identity minorities constitute a small number of respondents—likely too small to make sound inferences about their potentially unique paths to populist sentiment. Thus, oversamples are likely required to make claims about the links between the identity attachment of such groups and support for populism.
- We encourage future research to consider how marginalized groups, specifically, arrive at populist sentiment.
5. Even though respondents are not gathered using probability sampling, data collected by Lucid performs very well in generating accurate estimates of various political attitudes ([Coppock and McClellan, 2019](#)). We also took additional steps to ensure the quality of our data above and beyond Lucid's protocol for screening inattentive respondents (e.g., reCAPTCHA). First, respondents had to pass two attention checks in order to complete the survey. Second, we restricted our sample to only those respondents that spent an appropriate amount of time answering our questions—no less than one standard deviation below the median completion time (see [Read, Wolters, and Berinsky, 2021](#)). The sample size after these restrictions is 1003.
  6. The first eigenvalue from an exploratory factor analysis is 3.20; the second is 0.65, below 1. Moreover, the first factor explains 73% of variance shared between the item responses.
  7. We replicated our analyses using a shortened version of the [Oliver and Rahn \(2016\)](#) scale that includes only items capturing anti-elite (political elite, not scientific or economic elite), Manichean, or anti-pluralist sentiments, as those sentiments are at the core of other measures of populism. In short, the shortened scale is correlated 0.95 with the original scale and the patterns described below are substantively identical; see the appendix for details. Moreover, some social psychology scholarship on populism conceives of a populist identity, whereby one self-identifies as a populist and can have political beliefs constrained by this identity. In this paper, our measure is closer to “operational populism,” or the practical manifestations of populist beliefs. While we suspect our measure of populism is related to both populist identity and populist belief system constraint, we cannot say so with the data we possess.
  8. Note that non-white respondents did not complete the white identity questions. We discuss how non-white respondents are handled in our analyses in greater detail below.
  9. The LPA model is estimated with maximum likelihood estimation. Even though the LPA function does not use listwise deletion, thereby removing non-white respondents who did not answer the white identity questions from the analysis sample, subsequent analyses do utilize listwise deletion (including the generation of class means utilized in [Figures 2 and 3](#)). This effectively limits the inferences we can make to non-white respondents.
  10. Some variable labels have been slightly altered, or abbreviated, in order to fit entirely within the plotting area. For instance, racial resentment is labeled “resent” in the figure; egocentric victimhood is “ego. victim.”
  11. Of course, we can engage in this same type of reasoning for those classes low in populism. As can be seen in the [Supplemental Appendix](#), Class 1 and Class 2 are more liberal and Democratic than Class 3, but all three are relatively similar (i.e., low) in populism. Some classes low in populism (e.g., Class 2) are more attached to their white



identity than others (e.g., Class 1). One can see that Class 1 is very low in most of the variables considered. From these relationships, we infer that it is not that individuals low in, say, conspiratorial thinking are low in populism. Rather, it is individuals low in conspiratorial thinking *and* low in Christian nationalism and low in white identity that exhibit lower levels of populist support, on average.

## References

- Alvarez, R. Michael, Ines Levin, and Lucas Núñez. The Four Faces of Political Participation in Argentina: Using Latent Class Analysis to Study Political Behavior. *The Journal of Politics*. 2017; 79(4): 1386–1402.
- Armaly, Miles T., and Adam M. Enders. 2022. “Why Me?” the Role of Perceived Victimhood in American Politics.” *Political Behavior* 44: 1583–1609.
- Arzheimer, Kai, and Elisabeth Carter. 2009. “Christian Religiosity and Voting for West European Radical Right Parties.” *West European Politics* 32 (5): 985–1011.
- Bakker, Bert N., Matthijs Rooduijn, and Gijs Schumacher. 2016. “The Psychological Roots of Populist Voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany.” *European Journal of Political Research* 55 (2): 302–320.
- Berman, Sheri. 2021. “The Causes of Populism in the West.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 24: 71–88.
- Bonikowski, Bart. 2017. “Ethno-nationalist Populism and the Mobilization of Collective Resentment.” *The British Journal of Sociology* 68: S181–S213.
- Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth. 2021. “Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash.” *International Organization* 75: 464–494.
- Cena, Lorenzo, Michele Roccato, and Silvia Russo. 2023. “Relative Deprivation, National GDP and Right-Wing Populism: A Multilevel, Multinational Study.” *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology* 33 (1): 32–42.
- Coppock, Alexander, and Oliver A. McClellan. 2019. “Validating the Demographic, Political, Psychological, and Experimental Results Obtained from a New Source of Online Survey Respondents.” *Research and Politics* 2019: 1–15.
- Daenekindt, Stijn, Willem de Koster, and Jeroen van der Waal. 2017. “How People Organise Cultural Attitudes: Cultural Belief Systems and the Populist Radical Right.” *West European Politics* 40 (4): 791–811.
- der Meer, V, GLA Toni, M Hameleers, and A. C. Kroon. 2020. “Faces of Biased Selectivity: A Latent Profile Analysis to Classify News Audiences and Their Selection Biases in the US and UK.” *International Journal of Communication* 14: 19.
- Eichengreen, Barry. 2018. *The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era*. Oxford University Press.
- Evans, Peter P., Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. 1985. *Bringing the State Back in*. Cambridge University Press.
- Feldman, Stanley. 2021. “Authoritarianism, Education, and Support for Right-Wing Populism.” In *The Psychology of Populism*, 348–364. Routledge.
- Fieschi, Catherine, and Paul Heywood. 2004. “Trust, Cynicism and Populist Anti-politics.” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9 (3): 289–309.
- Geurkink, Bram, Andrej Zaslove, Roderick Sluiter, and Kristof Jacobs. 2020. “Populist Attitudes, Political Trust, and External Political Efficacy: Old Wine in New Bottles?” *Political Studies* 68 (1): 247–267.
- Gidron, Noam, and Peter A. Hall. 2020. “Populism as a Problem of Social Integration.” *Comparative Political Studies* 53 (7): 1027–1059.
- Guiso, Luigi, Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli, and Tommaso Sonno. 2017. *Demand and Supply of Populism*. London, UK: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Harteveld, Eelco, Wouter Van Der Brug, Sarah De Lange, and Tom Van Der Meer. 2022. “Multiple Roots of the Populist Radical Right: Support for the Dutch PVV in Cities and the Countryside.” *European Journal of Political Research* 61 (2): 440–461.
- Hofstetter, Nathalie, and Maximilian Filsinger. 2024. “A Justified Bad Reputation after All? Dark Personality Traits and Populist Attitudes in Comparative Perspective.” *Electoral Studies* 87: 102728.
- Huddy, Leonie, Lilliana Mason, and Lene Aarøe. 2015. “Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity.” *American Political Science Review* 109 (1): 1–17.
- Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. “Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76 (3): 405–431.
- Jardina, Ashley. 2019. *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira, and Steven M Van Hauwaert. 2020. “The Populist Citizen: Empirical Evidence from Europe and Latin America.” *European Political Science Review* 12 (1): 1–18.
- Kam, Cindy D., and Camille D. Burge. 2018. “Uncovering Reactions to the Racial Resentment Scale across the Racial Divide.” *The Journal of Politics* 80 (1): 314–320.
- Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kinnvall, Catarina, and Ted Svensson. 2022. “Exploring the Populist ‘mind’: Anxiety, Fantasy, and Everyday Populism.” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 24 (3): 526–542.
- Kyle, Jordan, and Limor Gultchin. 2018. “Populists in Power Around the World.” Technical Report Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.
- Lenz, Gabriel S. 2012. *Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians’ Policies and Performance*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Levi, Ron, Ioana Sendroiu, and John Hagan. 2020. “America First Populism, Social Volatility, and Self-Reported

- Arrests." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 117 (43): 26703–26709.
- Lowndes, Joseph. 2017. "Populism in the United States." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 232–247. Oxford University Press.
- Lüders, Adrian, Karolina Urbanska, Robin Wollast, Armelle Nugier, and Serge Guimond. Bottom-up Populism: How Relative Deprivation and Populist Attitudes Mobilize Leaderless Anti-government Protest. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*. 2021; 9: 506–519.
- Mansbridge, Jane, and Stephen Macedo. 2019. "Populism and Democratic Theory." *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 15: 59–77.
- Marchlewska, Marta, Aleksandra Cichocka, Orestis Panayiotou, Kevin Castellanos, and Jude Batayneh. 2018. "Populism as Identity Politics: Perceived In-Group Disadvantage, Collective Narcissism, and Support for Populism." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 9 (2): 151–162.
- Marzouki, Nadia, Duncan McDonnell, and Olivier Roy. 2016. *Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion*. Oxford University Press.
- Mason, Lilliana. 2015. "I Disrespectfully Agree": The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (1): 128–145.
- Mason, Lilliana, and Julie Wronski. 2018. "One Tribe to Bind Them All: How Our Social Group Attachments Strengthen Partisanship." *Political Psychology* 39: 257–277.
- Masyn, Katherine E. 2013. "Latent Class Analysis and Finite Mixture Modeling." In *The Oxford Handbook of Quantitative Methods in Psychology: Vol. 2: Statistical Analysis*, edited by D Todd. Little.
- McDonnell, Duncan, and Annika Werner. 2020. *International Populism: The Radical Right in the European Parliament*. USA: Oxford University Press.
- Mudde, Cas. 2004. "The Populist Zeitgeist." *Government and Opposition* 39 (4): 541–563.
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2018. "Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda." *Comparative Political Studies* 51 (13): 1667–1693.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2018. "Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115 (19): E4330–E4339.
- Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nylund, Karen L., Tihomir Asparouhov, and Bengt O. Muthén. Deciding on the Number of Classes in Latent Class Analysis and Growth Mixture Modeling: A Monte Carlo Simulation Study. *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal*. 2007; 14(4): 535–569.
- Oliver, J. Eric, and Wendy M. Rahn. 2016. "Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 667: 189–206.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. 2017. "Social Psychological Perspectives on Trump Supporters." *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 5 (1): 107–116.
- Piazza, James A. Forthcoming. "Populism and Support for Political Violence in the United States: Assessing the Role of Grievances, Distrust of Political Institutions, Social Change Threat, and Political Illiberalism." *Political Research Quarterly*.
- Piketty, Thomas. 2017. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Read, Blair, Lukas Wolters, and Adam J Berinsky. 2021. "Racing the Clock: Using Response Time as a Proxy for Attentiveness on Self-Administered Surveys." *Political Analysis* 30: 1–20.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2018. "What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties." *European Political Science Review* 10 (3): 351–368.
- Rooduijn, Matthijs, Wouter Van Der Brug, and Sarah L. De Lange. 2016. "Expressing or Fuelling Discontent? the Relationship between Populist Voting and Political Discontent." *Electoral Studies* 43: 32–40.
- Rydgren, Jens. 2005. "Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family." *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (3): 413–437.
- Silva, Castanho Bruno, Sebastian Jungkunz, Marc Helbling, and Levente Littvay. 2020. "An Empirical Comparison of Seven Populist Attitudes Scales." *Political Research Quarterly* 73 (2): 409–424.
- Smith, Heather J, F Pettigrew Thomas, Gina M Pippin, and Silvana Bialosiewicz. 2012. "Relative Deprivation: A Theoretical and Meta-Analytic Review." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 16 (3): 203–232.
- Stecula, Dominik A., and Mark Pickup. 2021. "How Populism and Conservative Media Fuel Conspiracy Beliefs about COVID-19 and what it Means for COVID-19 Behaviors." *Research & Politics* 8 (1): 2053168021993979.
- Urbiniati, Nadia. 2019. "Political Theory of Populism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22: 111–127.
- Uscinski, Joseph E., Adam M. Enders, Michelle I. Seelig, Casey A. Klofstad, John R. Funchion, Caleb Everett, Stefan Wuchty, Kamal Premaratne, and Manohar N. Murthi. 2021. "American Politics in Two Dimensions: Partisan and Ideological Identities versus AntiEstablishment Orientations." *American Journal of Political Science* 65 (4): 877–895.
- Whitehead, Andrew L., Samuel L. Perry, and Joseph O. Baker. 2018. "Make America Christian Again: Christian Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election." *Sociology of Religion* 79 (2): 147–171.